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Abstract 
The bioeconomy is at the centre of many EU challenges such as growth and jobs creation, 
climate change, food security and resource depletion. This paper analyses the resilience of the 
EU bioeconomy towards contrasting, medium-term visions characterised by diversified policy 
instruments. To this purpose, a state-of-the-art modelling framework, supported with a 
database specifically extended for the need of the analysis of a future EU bioeconomy, are 
employed. Possible evolutions of the traditional and newer bio-based sectors in the EU are 
studied under two futures characterized by polar choice in terms of agricultural, trade, biofuel 
and climatic EU policies. Both exploratory scenarios are compared with a baseline built as a 
most plausible future in 2030. In analysing the challenges of the bioeconomy, the paper 
focuses on the issue of policy coherence, using a decomposition methodology to evaluate the 
isolated impact of each policy within the formulated scenarios. The underlying message of the 
analysis is that the bioeconomy in the EU is set to face considerable challenges in the future.  
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1. Introduction 
A key component of the European Union (EU) Bioeconomy Strategy (EC, 2012) is to 
stimulate research and development activities which can identify and enhance knowledge of 
best practise in biomass usage across different end uses and concomitantly, generate policy 
recommendations to reconcile the broad goals of (inter alia) wealth generation and 
employment, food security, responsible resource usage and environmental preservation.  
Casual observation reveals that biomass policies in the EU are fragmented (i.e., the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP); biofuels mandates; 2020 climate and energy package), which 
potentially leads to policy inconsistency. For example, encouraging biomass usage for energy 
may adversely affect carbon sequestration and therefore GHG emissions limits. Similarly, 
implementing a strategy for responsible sustainable growth (i.e., maintaining biodiversity, 
cultural landscapes and renewable energy) may induce limits on employment generation. Thus, 
the key challenge is one of ‘policy coherence’, which, it is recognised, must allow for, “...fair 
competition between the various uses of biomass resources (across competing sectors)”, 
although even the interpretation of ‘fair’ remains open to debate (Hamje et al., 2014, p.7). 
In recognition of the immediate need to take action, a wide range of qualitative and 
quantitative EU funded foresight studies have emerged with a medium term (2030+) horizon. 
Although overlapping, a number of studies focus of specific aspects of the aforementioned 
(interconnected) challenges, ranging from issues of land use (VOLANTE, 2010), food security 
(FoodSecure, 2012, Maggio et al., 2015) agri-food market trends (von Lampe et al., 2014b), or 
‘positioning’ reports on the current and possible future state of the bioeconomy (EC, 2015). A 
common theme in all of these studies is the design of alternate futures, each of which 
acknowledges that decisions taken today have repercussions for future generations. These 
‘pathways’ therefore characterise diverse socio-political and -economic visions which govern 
the cognitive processes behind policy making. From a methodological standpoint, quantitative 
foresight assessments (VOLANTE, 2010, FoodSecure, 2012, von Lampe et al., 2014b), resort 
to a neoclassical multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) representation. This class 
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of mathematical simulation model has become a de facto toolbox of choice, since it 
encapsulates all sectors and economic actors (national and global) within a fully 
comprehensive, consistent and closed economic system of equations. 
In the current EU focused study, a quantitative foresight exercise is carried out to examine the 
future prospects for bio-based sectors. A key aim is to understand the resilience of the EU 
bioeconomy in the face of contrasting medium-term (i.e., 2030) visions characterised by a 
portfolio of diversified bio-based policy instruments. This implies state-of-the-art modelling of 
said policies and a careful design to implement precise policy shocks. Given the globally 
interconnected nature of biomass markets, a credible foresight study must explicitly capture 
world market developments. For this reason, the current study also employs a multi-region 
CGE approach, calibrated to the well-known Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database 
(Narayanan et al., 2015). An important scientific development is that significant data 
enhancements are made to include additional sources of biomass supply and demand which go 
far beyond the standard definitions within the national accounts used in GTAP. As a direct 
response to the key question of policy coherence, the research seeks to understand the relative 
strength of the policy drivers in shaping bio-based market trends in each of the different 
narratives and to flag up, where present, policy conflicts. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section two describes the methodology and 
scenario design. Sections three and four discuss the results of the baseline and scnearios, 
respectively. Section five concludes. 
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2. Methodology and Scenario Design 
2.1 Model and Data 
The well documented GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) and associated database (Narayanan et al., 
2015) form the basis of the current research. In essence, the model relies on a mathematical 
representation of neoclassical microeconomic optimisation to enumerate demand and supply 
behaviour. Subject to a series of exogenous variable shocks (i.e. tax, productivity or factor 
endowments), prices and outputs endogenously adjust subject to the underlying market 
clearing and Keynesian macroeconomic accounting equations to ensure an ‘equilibrium’ (i.e., 
supply equals demand, zero profits, macro aggregates balance).  
For the purposes of the current study, a series of data and modelling innovations are included 
to depict in detail, different sources of biomass supply (i.e., residues, plantations and pellets), 
first generation biofuels (from sugar, starch and oil crops), second generation biofuels 
produced from lignocellulosic biomass (residues, plantations, pellets), bio-electricity and 
biochemical activities using conventional agricultural crops and lignocellulose biomass. In 
short, as well as  extending current bio-based activities beyond the traditional national 
accounts classification, the research also includes ‘new’ technologies (i.e. second generation 
biofuels) which, hitherto, are still in their infancy but may be expected to play a key role in 
shaping the bioeconomy in the medium term.  
To undertake the required sector splits and rebalancing required in the GTAP database, data on 
production volumes, conversion efficiencies, cost structures, and trade and transport costs were 
collected for the benchmark year of 2007. Most of the data on the new bio-based sectors come 
from relevant studies and models. In particular data on production, conversion efficiencies, 
costs of capital, operation & maintenance and other production costs come from the IMAGE 
model from the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Daioglou et al., 2015). The 
sustainable potential of (lignocellulose) residues in the EU is based on results from the 
Biomass Policies project (Elbersen, 2015). On the other hand, data for the rest of the world are 
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taken from Daioglou et al., (2015). A full list of these sources is extensively described in van 
Meijl et al., (2016). 
The result is a new subset of data linkages both between the new bio-based sectors and with 
the rest of the economy. Figure 1 provides a schematic illustration of these linkages, where the 
coloured boxes represent ‘new’ bio-based sectors and the grey boxes are usual GTAP sectors. 
The arrows indicate the direction of the biomass and bio-based energy and chemicals flows. 
For example, the fuel sector mixes petroleum with first generation and second generation 
biofuels. 
 
Figure 1 Overview of bio-based sectors and linkages in the model database. 
Source: Van Meijl, 2016, p. 63.  
 
To this database, an advanced recursive dynamic variant of the GTAP model, known as the 
Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET) (Woltjer and Kuiper, 2014), is 
calibrated. The MAGNET model provides flexibility to choose from a list of non-standard 
modules to address the most pertinent aspects of the study at hand. The version of the 
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MAGNET model employed here explicitly treats the specificities of agricultural factors (the 
main source of biomass generation) and input markets to cater for input substitution 
possibilities, heterogeneous land transfer and relative wage differentials between agricultural 
and non-agricultural labour and capital. In addition, given the time dimension of the study, the 
model captures changes in the pattern of (agri-food) demand elasticities resulting from 
structural economic change (Woltjer and Kuiper, 2014). A Leontief joint production 
technology is assumed in forestry and agricultural sectors to model residue by-products, whilst 
the same modelling technique is used to treat oilcake and distiller's dried grains and soluble 
(DDGS) feeds by-products from first generation bio-diesel and bio-ethanol sectors. Explicit 
modelling of biomass policies borrows from the latest developments in the literature. More 
specifically, additional modules capture the latest reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) (Boulanger and Philippidis, 2015), first generation fiscally neutral biofuel blending 
mandates (Banse et al., 2008) and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions and carbon 
taxes (Burniaux and Truong, 2002). 
 
To aid the exposition, the paper draws on the results decomposition method of ‘subtotals’ 
(Harrison et al., 2000). More specifically, on running a complex scenario with an array of 
shocks (i.e., endowments, tariffs, technology change etc.), this methods allow calculating the 
part-worth of the resulting endogenous variable change that corresponds to a specific 
exogenous shock, or pre-specified group of exogenous shocks. Thus, when comparing each of 
the scenarios with the baseline, the comparative ‘part-worth’ importance of the four main 
policy indicators plus the macroeconomic projections and the changes in world energy prices 
are evaluated to better understand the role that policies and exogenous assumptions have to 
play (if any) in shaping bio-based market trends.  
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2.2 Aggregation and Closure 
The database is disaggregated into 49 tradable goods, of which 39 are bio-based sectors (Table 
1). To more adequately characterise production decisions within bio-based activities, non-bio-
based inputs are also included (i.e., feeds, fertilisers, fossil fuels). With an EU focus, the 
largest EU member states players are included, as well as EU regions where bioeconomic 
activity (primarily, agriculture) is relatively important (i.e., Ireland and Poland). Further EU 
member state disaggregation reflects pragmatic modelling considerations to incorporate the 
rebate mechanism of the CAP budget (Boulanger and Philippidis, 2015), whilst Croatia is 
separated to model its entry to the EU and associated CAP budget. For the non-EU regions, 
‘large players’ (both net exporters and importers) and impoverished partners on world bio-
based markets are identified. All residual trade and output flows are captured within a Rest of 
the Word (ROW) region. 
A standard neoclassical closure rule is employed where the balance on the trade account and 
the capital account net to zero. In EU regions with additional intra-community CAP payments 
flows, adjustments are made to regional savings to ensure that the general equilibrium circular 
flow condition of the data remains intact. 
Table 1: GTAP data aggregation 
 
2.3. Baseline and Scenario Design 
The baseline (BL) design is spread over three time intervals (2007-2013; 2013-2020; 2020-
2030) which are chosen to coincide with the EU’s multiannual financial framework, Croatia’s 
EU accession and the EU’s climate and energy package 2020. The BL encompasses past and 
‘foreseeable’ future market developments focusing on the EU’s main bio-based activity policy 
drivers (i.e., CAP, trade policy; biofuel mandates and GHG reductions). The first period 
(2007-2013) captures the main historical market trends, whilst the 2013-2030 timeframe is 
described in Table 2. 
9 
 
In addition to policy shocks, projections of population and real GDP growth taken from von 
Lampe et al. (2014b) are assumed to follow a status quo baseline trend. In MAGNET, labour 
endowments mimic population changes (fixed employment rates), capital shadows real GDP 
trends (fixed medium to long-run capital-output ratio), whilst natural resources are assumed to 
grow at one-quarter the rate of the capital stock. Given the importance of bioenergy markets in 
the EU, World Bank (2015) medium term world price shocks to fossil fuels are also 
implemented. 
Table 2: Assumptions shaping the ‘status quo’ baseline scenario (2013-2020-2030) 
As a departure from the BL, two paradigms are identified for the decade 2020-2030 which take 
polar paths to epitomise changes in the EU’s stature within a hypothetical world order (Table 
3). These alternate futures are characterised by the degree of priority placed on each of the four 
policy pillars: CAP, trade, biofuels and GHGs. Classified as inward- and outward-looking 
policy worlds (henceforth known as ‘IL’ and ‘OL’), the underlying ethos is the degree to 
which the EU attempts to marry tangible goals (e.g., economic growth and employment 
generation), with philanthropic concepts of poverty reduction (e.g., improve the incomes of 
poorer countries through ‘fairer’ trade), environmental protection, biodiversity and green 
growth (i.e., GHG emissions limits, CAP Policy), as well as reduced fossil fuel dependence 
(e.g., biofuel policy) (Table 3). 
Thus, in the OL scenario the EU behaves as an altruistic leader on the world stage. More 
specifically, the EU is leading the fight on reducing GHG emissions (in the absence of any 
binding commitments at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 
2015, only proposed EU reductions in GHGs are implemented), whilst championing a 
‘greener’ vision for the CAP. Energy policy is more orientated toward modern bio-based 
solutions, whilst the EU also has an instrumental role in forging a multilateral trade deal to 
help alleviating poverty. 
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The IL scenario takes an introspective approach to EU policy making. The EU moves toward 
existing fossil fuel technologies and promotes only neighbourhood and regional trade 
alliances. Finally, agricultural markets follow a more market oriented policy approach. 
 
Table 3: Assumptions shaping alternative policy paths (2020-2030) 
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3 Baseline Results (2013-2030) 
3.1 EU Bioeconomy Output 
The general trend (Table 4) is that bio-based EU activities grow at a relatively slower 
rate than the economy-wide average, such that resources are gradually diverted away from the 
bioeconomy. Furthermore, as EU real GDP is assumed to rise at a slower pace than almost all 
non-EU countries, EU trade competitiveness is eroded resulting in output falls. This is of 
particular relevance to ‘open’ bio-based (i.e., textiles, wearing apparel, leather and wood 
products), and fertiliser activities, which exhibit lower EU self-sufficiency ratios.  
Compared with the 31.7 index point rise in real GDP growth, primary agriculture 
remains static (increase of 1.9 index points), whilst higher value-added food production 
volume rises 12.3 index points. In part, this is due to low income elasticities on final demands 
for agricultural and food products. In addition, under the assumption of higher land 
productivities increases in non EU regions, there is greater import competition in EU 
agriculture.  
Table 4: EU bio-based output volume changes 
 
Biomass supply (includes plantations, residues and pellets), bioenergy (1
st
 and 2
nd
 
generation biofuels and bio-electricity) and bio-chemical sectors all record impressive output 
growth, albeit from small production bases. Compared with 2013, by 2030 bio-chemical, 
biomass and bioenergy activities increase by a factor of 1.36, 2.16 and 3.12, respectively. The 
effect of the mandate is especially clear in bioenergy, and by extension, biomass providing 
sectors (which in turn supply less to bio-chemicals activities). With falling biofuel prices  
accompanied by strong projected price rises in crude oil over the decade 2020-2030, a strong 
substitution effect in favour of biofuels is observed. 
The downward trend observed in EU market prices partly reflects economy wide (Hicks 
neutral) productivity growth to meet targeted real GDP growth rates. 
    
3.2 EU Bioeconomy Employment 
The employment trends measured in thousands of head for the EU bio-based sectors are 
presented in Table 5. Following the output trends EU bioeconomy employment falls from an 
estimated 17.8 million persons in 2013 to 13.6 million by 2030. The results show increasing 
employment opportunities in the bioenergy sector (from 19,000 to 79,000), although this 
12 
 
cannot mitigate the general trend that by 2030, bio-based employment share will fall from 
8.1% in 2013 to 5.7% in 2030. 
Table 5: EU bio-based employment (1000’s head) 
 
3.3 Land Markets 
In MAGNET, parameterised estimates of land response by each of the GTAP regions 
are taken from a physical land use model known as IMAGE (Eickhout et al., 2009). The results 
show that by 2030 for most regions land usage remains reasonably close to 2013 levels (Table 
6). In the majority of cases, the increased need for land resulting from real growth, endowment 
and population projections is outweighed by land productivity improvements (projections). In 
the EU, land usage falls by 2.2 index points. As EU CAP payments contract, marginal land 
leaves agricultural production (-0.7 index points). Perhaps surprisingly, the biofuel mandate 
only generates slight increases in EU land use (0.1 index points), accompanied by increases in 
North America, and Mercosur from increases in EU bioenergy imports. On the other hand, the 
fall in Japanese land usage by 10 index points reflects the assumptions of relatively weak real 
GDP growth, population decline and larger GHG reductions. 
Table 6: Region land use  
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4. Scenario Results (2020-2030) 
4.1 EU Bioeconomy Output  
Comparing the IL with the BL, the EU real growth (0.2%) and the EU per capita utility or real 
income (0.4%) show a slight improvement (Table 7). Examining the shocks decomposition, 
the only policy contributor to this result is the elimination of the biofuel mandate. The EU’s 
decision to strengthen its neighbourhood policy and promote TTIP yields limited gains (0.01% 
GDP growth). This result reflects the eliminations in relatively low average applied tariff rates 
while no reductions in ‘behind the border’ non-tariff measures (NTMs) are modelled. 
Similarly, the elimination of all non-green Pillar 1 payments in a relatively ‘small’ sector such 
as agriculture in the EU, unsurprisingly, has very little macroeconomic impact. 
Table 7: Macro indicators (%) from the IL and OL scenarios compared with the BL 
(2020-2030) 
 
A different story emerges comparing the OL and BL scenarios. Real GDP in the EU falls 1.2% 
over the 2020-2030 decade, accompanied by a corresponding fall of 1.6% in real per capita 
incomes compared to the baseline. Over the 2020-2030 decade, multilateral trade reform is 
expected to generate moderate trade led GDP gains (0.1%). With more ambitious unilateral 
GHG reductions in the EU, the resulting rise in carbon taxes acts as a further constraint on EU 
growth (relative GDP fall of 1%).
1
 Similarly, higher biofuel mandate also leads to a relative 
GDP fall of 0.6%. This fall is mainly due to the biomass supply bottlenecks. The mandate 
significantly increases biofuel prices, forces reductions in fossil fuel usage, depresses 
petroleum output, and therefore stifles economic growth. As the EU’s bio-based and non-bio-
                                                     
1 By 2030, the ‘average’ EU28 carbon tax per tonne of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) of GHG emissions is €15/tonne 
CO2e in the baseline, €27/tonne CO2e in the IL scenarios and €95/tonne CO2e in the OL scenario (not shown). 
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based activities contract, non-EU regions witness small real growth gains (not shown).
2
 The 
GHG reductions generate smaller welfare losses than the biofuel mandate (despite generating 
larger relative real output falls), since GHG reductions are accompanied by tax revenue 
increases. 
The impact of the policy narratives on the EU bioeconomy output volumes is presented in 
Tables 8 and 9. Comparing the IL scenario with the BL (Table 8), the main message is that the 
isolated impact from the elimination of the biofuel mandate and associated fiscal support is 
clearly detrimental to the survival of the bioenergy sector (-91.4%), as well as the bio-based 
supply sector (-49.6%). Furthermore, this shock also generates further negative ripple effects 
for adjacent bioenergy feedstock and residue supply sectors (i.e., agriculture, forestry). The 
biochemical sector benefits (19%) as a (now) more attractive alternative source of biomass 
usage, whilst the large aggregate sectors of fossil fuels and energy and the rest of the economy 
('rest') also expand as primary resources are reallocated to non bioeconomy sectors.  
 
Table 8: Output volume changes (%) between the IL and BL scenarios (2020-2030) 
 
Comparing output change in the OL and BL scenarios (Table 9), the implication of increasing 
the biofuel mandate is to increase output in biomass supply (68%) and bioenergy (45%) 
activities, as well as in residue and feedstock supplies from agriculture and forestry. In 
addition, there is a multiplier effect in those downstream sectors that employ agriculture (food) 
and forestry (wood) products. On the other hand, in the large aggregate sectors (fossil fuel 
energy and ‘rest’), this policy generates output falls of -2.2% and -0.6%, respectively, leading 
to lower macro growth (as discussed above). The CAP has a similar output effect as in the IL 
scenario, although less pronounced given the re-distribution of Pillar 1 market support 
payments to Pillar 2 (rural development) objectives. 
                                                     
2 Over the 2020-2030 period, as a percentage of GDP, the largest relative gains are estimated for India (0.9%), 
China (0.3%), Mercosur (0.2%) and the USA (0.2%) (not shown) 
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Table 9: Output changes (%) between the OL and BL scenarios (2020-2030) 
 
The isolated impacts of the projections and world fossil fuel price shocks (unchanged from the 
BL), have significant incremental impacts for bioenergy activity when comparing with the BL, 
although starting from a small base. In the IL scenario (Table 8), as the mandate is eliminated, 
non-EU countries are also dumping cheaper biofuel exports (to the detriment of EU domestic 
production), whilst general rises in factor prices and the increased cost of (now non-
subsidised) biofuel inputs within the blending sector makes fossil fuel alternatives appear to be 
more attractive. In the OL scenario (Table 9) the increasing mandate pushes up the price of 
bioeconomy supply and second generation biofuels, which makes crude oil a more attractive 
prospect for petroleum refining. Similarly, with lesser (land) supply constraints in other 
countries (i.e., Mercosur and North America) and better growth prospects, there is more spare 
capacity for biofuels production. 
 
4.2 Bioeconomy Employment 
Exploiting employment data from 2013 (Ronzon et al., 2015), the employment trends 
measured in thousands of head for the EU28 bio-based sectors are presented in Table 10. As 
expected, the trends are driven by the output changes reported in section 3.2. A large 
proportion of bio-based employment is centred in the agricultural sector, which in the IL 
scenario contracts by 251,000 workers. This resulting loss of employment from EU agrifood 
production explains much of the fall in EU bio-based sector employment under this scenario. 
In addition, IL employment prospects in the bioenergy sector are reduced significantly (-
69,000 workers) and are not compensated by the small increase in traditional sectors as textile 
and wearing apparel (+1000 each) and the biochemical one (+5000). 
Table 10: EU28 bio-based employment (1000’s head) and share (%) 
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Comparing the OL with the BL, the primary agricultural sector sheds even more workers 
(approximately 360,000). Based on the output drivers, this results is a combination of (in order 
of magnitude) unilateral EU GHG emissions reductions, multilateral trade deal and CAP 
policy. Some job growth is recorded in the forestry and wood products sectors, whilst the 
bioenergy sector, despite the higher mandate, sheds 29,000 workers owing to the drop in 
derived demand from the downstream petroleum (blending) sector arising from the higher EU 
GHG reductions. Despite a very different combination of policy shocks in the IL and OL 
scenarios, the share of employment in bio-based activities falls to 5.6% (compared with 5.7% 
in the BL). 
4.3 Bioenergy Markets 
Table 11 illustrates the evolution of bioenergy production as a value share of total energy 
supply by country/region. With the EU’s steady promotion of biofuels in the BL, increases in 
non-EU bioenergy output (particularly Mercosur) are required to compensate the shortfall in 
internal EU production. By 2030, the EU bio-based energy falls from 5.3% of the total in the 
BL to 0.6% in the IL scenario. As the EU reduces its import dependence on biofuels, 
bioenergy production shares in non-EU regions fall, where the most marked effect is in 
Mercosur. In the OL scenario, the EU’s bioenergy output share rises to 9.1% in 2030. 
Noteworthy rises in EU import demand for bioenergy benefit non-EU producers, with the 
largest percentage point rises occurring in North America and Mercosur. 
Table 11: Output value share of bioenergy (%) in total energy production 
 
With removal of the biofuel mandate in the IL scenario, the isolated impact of the loss of the 
blending subsidy increases the relative market price of petroleum by 1.5% (Table 12). On the 
other hand, with reduced demand for biofuel inputs, there are relative market price falls in first 
generation biodiesel and biogasoline, whilst the cost of second generation inputs also falls 
(approximately 26 to 27%). 
17 
 
Comparing the OL and BL scenarios, the decomposition of the policy drivers shows that the 
bioenergy blending mandate plays an important role. This role is played in combination with 
greater EU GHG emissions reductions. Focusing on the impact of the former, the price of 
second generation (thermal and biochemical) biofuels and bio-electricity sectors soars 
compared with the BL (approximately 800%). This is the result of a highly ambitious second-
generation mandate (raised from 1.5% to 5%) which generates bottlenecks in the supply of 
feedstock from the infant industry activities of plantations, pellets and residues. As the 
necessary biofuel input subsidy rises to target this mandate, the (blended) petroleum price falls 
(-1.5%). Moreover, a substitution away from fossil fuels combined and an economic slowdown 
(negative real income) effect from the biofuel policy, reduces prices in other energy 
commodities. 
Table 12: Changes in energy prices compared with the BL (2020-2030) 
The other driving policy in the OL scenario is the additional unilateral reduction in EU GHG 
emissions. Through the imposition of further carbon taxes, there is an increase in the EU’s 
energy bill for final consumers of electricity (7.8%), gas (7.0%) and petroleum (3.1%), 
compared with the BL. The resulting output contraction in these refining and processing 
energy industries from higher EU GHG emissions reductions reduces derived demand for 
crude oil, gas, and bio-based energy inputs, thereby depressing market prices. Coal is used 
intensively in electricity generation and it is assumed to be relatively less substitutable, thus 
electricity demand for coal falls by less. 
4.4 Land Usage 
In Table 13 are presented the proportion of land devoted to first generation biofuels production 
in each of the regions by 2030. In the IL scenario, the elimination of the EU biofuel regime 
results in an almost total removal of biofuel land usage when compared with the BL. By 2030, 
compared with a 3.3% share of EU land in the BL, the EU biofuel land share drops to 
approximately 0.3%. As discussed above, in the non-EU regions, the cessation of EU biofuel 
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mandates also reduces biofuel land usage in Mercosur (from 2.7% to 1.1%) and North 
America (from 6.3% to 1.5%), compared to the baseline. 
Table 13: Evolution of land share (%) devoted to 1st generation biofuels by 
narratives 
 
In the OL scenario, a priori it can be expected to find increased land shares devoted to biofuel 
production with policy induced increases in the blending mandates. The simulation, however, 
shows that the impact of the EU’s additional GHG emissions reduces derived demand for bio-
based (and fossil based) fuels through the blending (petroleum) sector, leading to lower land 
usage compared with the baseline. Once again, the percentage point drop in biodiesel land 
usage is greater due to its greater input intensity in the EU blending industry. As the EU 
blending sector contracts, EU import demands for biofuels also fall, although Mercosur 
biodiesel land shares remain at a buoyant level, due to the greater opening of global markets 
under the multilateral trade negotiations.  
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5. Conclusions 
Employing a state-of-the-art CGE modelling framework supported with a database specifically 
extended for the need of this research and a decomposition technique to individuate part-worth 
impact of multiple shocks, this paper shed some light on possible evolution of the bioeconomy 
sectors in the EU. A baseline scenario depicting a plausible future in 2030 is compared with 
two alternative worlds characterized by polar choice in terms of agricultural, trade, biofuel and 
climatic EU policies. If in one scenario the EU behaves as an altruistic leader on the world 
stage leading the fight on reducing GHG emissions, another scenario depicts the EU taking an 
introspective approach to policy making moving toward existing fossil fuel technologies and 
promoting neighbourhood and regional trade alliances. 
Macroeconomic projections are the exogenous factor affecting most the macro and sectorial 
results presented; nevertheless the analysis shows the importance of the four policy pillars 
analysed (CAP, biofuel, trade and GHG) in shaping the future of the EU bioeconomy. 
The underlying message of the analysis is that the bioeconomy in the EU is set to face 
considerable challenges in the future. The importance of the bio-based sectors is expected to 
dwindle somewhat, both as a motor of jobs and growth. Macroeconomic results show that the 
IL scenario brings a negligible GDP and real income increase while these variables face a 
more significant reduction under the OL scenario mainly driven by the cost associated to more 
ambitious biofuel and GHG emission policies. 
A part from the CAP, whose impacts are limited on both scenarios, the three remaining 
policies have significant impacts on growth of EU bio-based sectors. An abolition of the 
biofuel mandate depresses biomass supply and bioenergy while the doubling of the mandate 
boost those sector while crowding-out the biochemical one. 
Regional trade as adopted in the IL has negligible effects on the economy while a multilateral 
agreement impacts negatively on the sectors currently more protected and more exposed to 
international competition such as agriculture, food industry and textile or clothing. 
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Finally, more ambitious GHG reduction affects adversely the agriculture but also, through 
backward effects due to the fall of fossil fuel, on the bioenergy and biomass. 
Despite these sectorial changes, employment reductions in bio-based sectors in the two 
scenarios are comparable to the BL one. 
Looking with more details into the bioenergy sector, policy shows a great impact in shaping 
both the share of bioenergy over total produced energy and in prices. In the OL scenario, if as 
expected share of bioenergy raises significantly, the bottlenecks in supply of feedstock to the 
second generation biofuel industry causes dramatic increase in the prices of bioelectricity and 
second generation biofuels. 
Despite the noticeable advancements in the analysis if the future EU bioeconomy sector, there 
are still areas which could benefit from further research. The biggest improve cold come from 
an additional effort in terms of data which could be further enhanced to include a better 
treatment of forestry (currently at an aggregate level) as well as account for the complex and 
promising "marine bioeconomy". 
A further point for future research is represented by the climate policies modelling. Whilst the 
model is currently fully equipped with behavioural equations to characterise different permit 
trading schemes and/or carbon tax policies, there remain areas for improvement. On the one 
hand, linking to the point above, a more recent version of the GTAP data will require a 
complete data set of GHG (CO2 and non CO2) emissions data. Perhaps even more 
importantly, land based sequestration of emissions are also not included in the current study. 
As a result, in its current form, the study does not account for the important role that 
alternative land uses (i.e., forestry and agriculture) could play in meeting GHG emissions 
targets and the far reaching implications this has for land using bio-based sectors.  
An additional aspect to keep in mind is the treatment of technological adaptation across 
different economic activities. Under the current assumption regarding the evolution of global 
GHG emissions, the incorporation of endogenous technological change mechanisms would 
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undoubtedly generate a more optimistic picture of the evolution of (bio-based) economic 
activity in the EU.  
To conclude, this paper represents an innovative contribution in providing a viable 
methodological framework for enumerating the opportunities and threats facing the collective 
of bio-based activities and in addressing the issue of policy coherence. 
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Tables 
Table 1: GTAP data aggregation 
Sectoral disaggregation (49 commodities): 
Primary agriculture (10 commodities): wheat; other grains; oilseeds; raw sugar; vegetables, 
fruits and nuts; other crops; cattle and sheep; pigs and poultry; raw milk; crude vegetable oil. 
Food and beverages (5 commodities): meat; dairy; sugar processing; vegetable oils and fats; 
other food and beverages.;  
Other ‘traditional’ bio-based activities (7 Commodities): fishing; forestry; textiles; wearing 
apparel; leather products; wood products; paper products and publishing. 
Biomass supply (5 commodities): plantations; residue processing; pellets; by-product 
residues from agriculture; by-product residues from forestry.  
Bio-based energy (5 commodities): 1st generation biodiesel; 1
st
 generation bioethanol; 
bioelectricity; 2
nd
 generation thermal technology biofuel; 2
nd
 generation biochemical 
technology biofuel. 
Bio-based chemicals (4 commodities): lignocelluose sugar; polylactic acid; polyethylene  
mixed bio/fossil chemicals. 
Bio-based and non bio-based animal feeds (3 commodities): bioethanol by-product distillers 
dried grains and solubles; biodiesel by-product oilcake; animal feed. 
Fertiliser (1 commodity): fertiliser. 
Fossil fuels and energy (6 commodities): crude oil; petroleum; gas; gas distribution; coal; 
electricity. 
Other sectors (3 commodities): chemicals, rubber and plastics; transport; other sectors. 
 
Regional disaggregation (23 regions): 
EU members (12 regions): United Kingdom (UK); Netherlands and Sweden (NLSWE); 
Denmark (DK); Germany (GER); Austria (AUT); France (FRA); Ireland (IRE); Italy (ITA); 
Poland (POL); Spain (SPA); Rest of the EU27 (RoEU27); Croatia (CRO) 
Non EU regions (11 regions): United States of America (USA); Canada (CAN); Mercosur 
(MERC); Russian Federation (RUS); China (CHN); India (IND); Japan (JAP); Australia & 
New Zealand (AUSNZ); Middle East & North Africa (MENA); Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); 
Rest of the World (ROW). 
 
Table 2: Assumptions shaping the ‘status quo’ baseline scenario (2013-2020-2030) 
2013-2020 period 
 
Projections 
 Skilled and unskilled labour, capital, natural resources, population, and real GDP (von 
Lampe et al, 2014b). 
Trade Policy 
 EU28 Enlargement elimination of border protection between incumbent EU27 
members and Croatia.  
 Extension to Croatia of an EU common external tariff (CET) on third country trade 
and reciprocal third country CETs extended to Croatia as an EU28 member. 
 Elimination of remaining EU28 tariffs with Peru, Columbia and South Korea. 
 40% (time linear) applied tariff reductions between Canada and the EU28 (agreement 
assumed enacted in 2016). 
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 Non reciprocal EBA EU tariff eliminations extended to Croatia. 
Agricultural Policy 
 Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 nominal expenditures are cut 13% and 18%, respectively 
(European Council, 2013). This corresponds to a 15.2% cut in nominal CAP budgetary 
funding. 
 Phasing in of decoupled payments for 2007 accession members and Croatia. 
 Greening of 30% of Pillar 1 payments, represented as Pillar 2 agro-environmental 
payments. 
 Pillar 2 payments extended to Croatia. 
 Abolition of raw milk (2015) and raw sugar (2017) quotas. 
 Croatia incorporated within the CAP budget and UK rebate mechanism. 
 Projected reduction in CAP expenditure share of the EU budget consistent with 15.2% 
cut in nominal CAP budget reduction. 
 Change in Swedish, Dutch and Danish lump sum rebates corresponding to CAP 
expenditure share in EU budget. UK rebate is maintained (European Council, 2013). 
Bioenergy Policy 
 EU28-wide 1st generation biofuel mandate of 7%; EU28-wide 2nd generation biofuel 
mandate of 1.5%.  
Environmental Policy 
 Global greenhouse gas emissions reductions consistent with business as usual 
projections (Labat et al., 2015). 
Fossil Fuel Prices 
 Impose projections of expected changes in world prices for coal, gas and crude oil 
(World Bank, 2015). 
 
2020-2030 period 
 
Projections 
 Skilled and unskilled labour, capital, natural resources, population, and real GDP (von 
Lampe et al, 2014b). 
Trade Policy 
 Elimination of remaining EU28 tariffs with Canada. 
Agricultural Policy 
 Projected reduction in CAP expenditure share of the EU budget. 
 Change in Swedish, Dutch and Danish lump sum rebates corresponding to CAP 
expenditure share in EU budget. 
 UK rebate is maintained 
Bioenergy Policy  
 Blending targets are relaxed, although the real value of (fiscally neutral) subsidy 
support is held fixed. 
Environmental Policy 
 GHG emissions reductions consistent with business as usual projections (Labat et al., 
2015). 
Fossil Fuel Prices 
 Impose expected changes in world prices for coal, gas and crude oil (World Bank, 
2015). 
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Table 3: Assumptions shaping alternative policy paths (2020-2030) 
Inward looking (2020-2030 period) – baseline projections and world fossil fuel price 
shocks plus: 
Trade Policy 
 Elimination of remaining EU28 tariffs with Canada. 
 Elimination of all EU-USA tariffs under a TTIP agreement.  
 EU FTAs under the Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova), the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia), 
North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Western Sahara) and Turkey. 
Agricultural Policy 
 Removal of all remaining Pillar 1 expenditures. 
 Projected reduction in CAP expenditure share of the EU budget consistent with 
elimination of Pillar 1. 
 Change in Swedish, Dutch and Danish lump sum rebates corresponding to CAP 
expenditure share in EU budget. Consistent with elimination of Pillar 1. 
 UK rebate is maintained. 
Bioenergy Policy 
 All blending mandates and existing subsidy support to the blending industry are 
removed.  
Environmental Policy 
 GHG emissions reductions are unchanged from the baseline. 
 
Outward looking (2020-2030 period) – baseline projections and world fossil fuel price 
shocks plus: 
Trade Policy 
 Elimination of remaining EU28 tariffs with Canada. 
 Multilateral 50% reduction in all applied tariffs in all partner countries. 
Agricultural Policy 
 All remaining Pillar 1 expenditures are uniformly distributed into Pillar 2 (CAP budget 
neutral compared with the baseline). 
 Projected reduction in CAP expenditure shares and lump sum rebates are the same as 
the baseline. 
 UK rebate is maintained. 
Bioenergy Policy  
 Increase mandate targets for 1st (10%) and 2nd (5%) generation biofuels. Policy 
remains fiscally neutral. 
Environmental Policy 
 EU GHG emissions reductions consistent with existing EU proposals to further reduce 
GHG emissions by 43% compared with 1990 levels. In remaining regions, GHG 
emissions reductions are unchanged from the baseline (Labat et al., 2015). 
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Table 4: EU bio-based output volume changes3 
 Index 2013=100 Decomposition of index by shocks (2013-2030) 
 2020 2030 Proj WP CAP Trade Biofue
l 
GHG 
agriculture 100.1 101.9 5.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -3.6 
food processing 104.0 112.3 13.8 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 -2.0 
forestry 103.2 108.8 4.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.9 
textiles 88.7 80.7 -18.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.9 
wearing apparel 86.0 76.7 -24.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.1 
leather products 74.8 59.5 -39.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -1.0 
wood products 96.6 95.3 -7.5 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.5 
paper products 107.6 118.8 19.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 
biomass supply 194.0 216.3 13.9 1.2 0.0 0.0 104.1 -3.1 
bioenergy 157.5 311.9 150.9 20.3 0.1 0.0 47.4 -6.7 
biochemicals 111.3 136.1 61.0 -1.6 1.9 -0.4 -20.4 -4.4 
fossil fuel & energy 109.1 112.4 14.4 3.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -5.3 
rest 113.1 132.0 32.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 
real GDP  113.3 131.7 31.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 
per capita utility 113.1 128.9 28.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 
Proj=all region’s projections shocks; WP=fossil fuel world prices; CAP=CAP policy; 
trade=Trade policy; Biofuel=Biofuel policy; GHG=Greenhouse gas policy 
 
Table 5: EU bio-based employment (1000’s head) 
 2013 2020 2030 
Bio-based 
employment 17,774 16,207 13,550 
Agriculture 9,980 9,189 7,822 
Food processing 4,676 4,307 3,632 
Forestry 505 449 345 
Fishing 173 170 157 
Textiles 226 180 112 
Wearing apparel 375 289 169 
Leather products 158 107 50 
Wood products 1,043 893 640 
Paper products 593 569 518 
Bioenergy 19 27 79 
Bio-chemicals 26 26 27 
Share of total (%) 8.08 7.20 5.73 
Source: Eurostat (2015) and own calculations 
Note: In all but two sectors, employment data for 2013 was taken from Eurostat (2015). In the biofuels sector, a 
2011 EU estimate of 19,000 workers is employed (Piotrowski and Carus, 2015), whilst employing the same 
reference, it is assumed that five percent of the chemical sector workforce is dedicated to bio-chemical production. 
The employment data (thousands of head) are generated from a side calculation using the percentage change in 
labour units demanded calculated within the main model. 
 
                                                     
3 Proj=all region’s projections shocks; WP=fossil fuel world prices; CAP=CAP policy; Trade=Trade policy; 
Biofuel=Biofuel policy; GHG=Greenhouse gas policy 
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Table 6: Region land use  
 2013=100 Decomposition of index (2013-2030) 
Land use 2020 2030 Proj WP CAP Trade BF GHG 
EU28 98.3 97.8 -1.5 0.1 -0.7 0.0 0.1 -0.2 
North America 97.9 96.0 -1.3 0.7 0.0 -0.5 0.4 -3.3 
Mercosur 100.3 105.3 -15.4 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 19.2 
Russia 99.8 96.0 -2.7 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.3 -2.1 
China 103.2 104.3 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
India 100.1 100.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Japan 97.2 90.3 -9.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 
Rest 97.2 99.5 -15.1 -1.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 16.2 
 
Table 7: Macro indicators (%) from the IL and OL scenarios compared with the BL 
(2020-2030) 
   Decomposition by shocks vs. BL (2020-2030)  
IL vs BL BL IL Proj WP CAP Trade Biofuel GHG IL vs BL 
Real GDP 16.3 16.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 
Per capita utility 14.0 14.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 
OL vs BL BL OL Proj WP CAP Trade Biofuel GHG OL vs BL 
Real GDP 16.3 15.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.6 -1.0 -1.2 
Per capita utility 14.0 12.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -0.8 -1.6 
 
Table 8: Output volume changes (%) between the IL and BL scenarios (2020-2030) 
   Decomposition by shocks vs. BL (2020-2030) Tot.diff 
IL vs BL BL IL Proj WP CAP Trade Biofuel GHG IL vs BL 
Agriculture 1.7 -2.3 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -0.1 -1.2 0.0 -4.0 
food processing 7.9 5.6 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 0.0 -2.2 
Forestry 5.6 3.5 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -1.2 -0.1 -2.1 
Textiles -8.9 -8.3 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Wearing apparel -11.0 -10.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.7 
Leather products -20.1 -19.6 0.4 -0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.5 
Wood products -1.4 -2.0 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.6 
Paper products 10.3 10.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
Biomass supply 23.3 -33.1 -5.6 -0.7 0.2 -0.4 -49.6 -0.2 -56.4 
Bioenergy 133.4 -66.2 -76.5 -33.8 -0.2 0.0 -91.4 2.2 -199.6 
Biochemical 17.8 42.9 3.9 2.3 -0.1 -0.1 19.3 -0.1 25.2 
Fos fuel & 
energy 2.9 1.1 -2.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -1.8 
Rest 16.6 16.8 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 
Table 9: Output changes (%) between the OL and BL scenarios (2020-2030) 
   Decomposition by shocks vs. BL (2020-2030) Tot.diff 
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OL vs BL BL OL Proj WP CAP Trade Biofuel GHG OL vs BL 
Agriculture 1.7 -4.4 -0.7 0.1 -0.6 -1.6 1.2 -4.5 -6.1 
food processing 7.9 4.3 -0.8 -0.4 -0.2 -1.8 1.2 -1.6 -3.6 
Forestry 5.6 27.2 -12.2 -1.0 0.0 0.3 41.0 -6.6 21.5 
Textiles -8.9 -13.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -6.6 0.4 2.0 -4.3 
Wearing apparel -11.0 -14.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 -6.2 0.2 2.8 -3.1 
Leather products -20.1 -22.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 -6.1 0.5 3.0 -2.2 
Wood products -1.4 5.3 -2.2 -0.7 0.0 0.3 8.9 0.5 6.7 
Paper products 10.3 10.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.6 -0.5 0.0 
Biomass supply 23.3 58.0 -20.4 -3.5 0.1 0.2 68.0 -9.8 34.7 
Bioenergy 133.4 57.7 -74.2 -39.0 0.0 0.1 44.9 -7.5 -75.7 
Biochemical 17.8 -1.0 9.7 2.6 0.0 -0.9 -35.6 5.6 -18.8 
Fos fuel & 
energy 2.9 -8.6 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 -2.2 -9.6 -11.6 
Rest 16.6 14.9 -0.3 0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.6 -1.4 -1.7 
 
Table 10: EU28 bio-based employment (1000’s head) and share (%) 
 2030 BL 2030 IL vs. BL 2030 OL vs. BL 
Bio-based 
employment 13,550 -384 -306 
Agriculture 7,822 -251 -360 
Food industry 3,632 -54 -67 
Forestry 345 -8 90 
Textiles 112 1 -5 
Wearing apparel 169 1 -6 
Leather 50 0 -1 
Wood 640 -3 42 
Paper 518 0 2 
Bioenergy 79 -69 -29 
Biochemicals 27 5 -3 
Share of total (%) 5.73 5.57 5.60 
 
Table 11: Output value share of bioenergy (%) in total energy production 
 2013 2020 2030 BL 2030 IL 2030 OL 
EU28 1.8 2.9 5.3 0.6 9.1 
N. America 1.8 1.7 2.9 0.7 3.3 
Mercosur 2.4 2.5 5.3 2.0 5.9 
Russia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
China 0.5 0.6 1.5 0.3 1.8 
India 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.3 1.0 
Japan 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.1 
RoW 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 
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Table 12: Changes in energy prices compared with the BL (2020-2030) 
   Decomposition by shocks vs. BL (2020-2030) Tot.diff 
IL vs BL BL IL Proj WP CAP Trade Biofuel GHG IL vs BL 
crude oil 30.0 30.0 0.3 -0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1 
petroleum 9.7 13.2 1.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.1 3.5 
biodiesel -18.4 -27.0 -0.5 -2.5 0.2 0.0 -6.1 0.3 -8.6 
biogasoline -15.2 -29.5 0.1 -1.9 0.4 -0.1 -13.5 0.7 -14.3 
gas 10.5 10.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.3 
coal 29.7 32.2 1.9 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 2.5 
electricity -10.5 -7.9 2.6 -0.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 2.6 
gas distribution -9.3 -7.1 2.1 -0.7 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 2.2 
bio-electricity -15.1 -48.1 -2.4 -4.9 0.1 -0.2 -25.8 0.3 -33.0 
thermal 2
nd
-gen -15.2 -48.4 -2.7 -4.8 0.1 -0.3 -25.8 0.3 -33.2 
bio-chem 2
nd
-
gen -15.3 -49.6 -2.8 -5.0 0.1 -0.3 -26.7 0.3 -34.3 
   
 
Decomposition by shocks vs. BL (2020-2030) Tot.diff 
OL vs BL BL OL Proj WP CAP Trade Biofuel GHG OL vs BL 
crude oil 30.0 29.4 0.2 1.4 0.0 -0.1 -1.1 -1.1 -0.6 
petroleum 9.7 13.6 1.3 1.2 0.0 -0.1 -1.5 3.1 3.9 
biodiesel -18.4 -23.1 -3.1 -0.8 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -4.8 
biogasoline -15.2 -19.9 -3.6 -0.4 0.4 -0.5 0.0 -0.6 -4.7 
gas 10.5 7.8 -0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -2.1 -2.6 
coal 29.7 44.5 4.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -4.6 15.7 14.8 
electricity -10.5 -3.5 -0.4 1.9 0.0 -0.4 -1.9 7.8 7.0 
gas distribution -9.3 -3.2 0.6 1.9 0.0 -0.4 -2.9 7.0 6.1 
bio-electricity -15.1 306.4 
-
332.3 -2.8 -0.7 2.9 803.5 -149.2 321.5 
thermal 2
nd
-gen -15.2 301.2 
-
324.5 -2.8 -0.7 2.8 787.4 -145.9 316.3 
bio-chem 2
nd
-
gen -15.3 312.8 
-
336.8 -2.9 -0.7 2.9 817.0 -151.4 328.1 
 
Table 13: Evolution of land share (%) devoted to 1st generation biofuels  
2030 BL EU North America Mercosur 
biogasoline (1
st
-generation) 1,25 3,47 1,01 
biodiesel (1
st
-generation) 2,04 2,85 1,69 
1st generation biofuels 3,29 6,32 2,71 
 
2030 IL vs. BL EU North America Merc 
biogasoline (1
st
-generation) -1,17 -2,33 -0,66 
biodiesel (1
st
-generation) -1,86 -2,49 -0,90 
1st generation biofuels -3,03 -4,82 -1,57 
 
2030 OL vs. BL EU North America Merc 
biogasoline (1
st
-generation) -0,72 -0,25 -0,11 
biodiesel (1
st
-generation) -0,99 -0,77 0,12 
1st generation biofuels -1,70 -1,02 0,01 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Overview of bio-based sectors and linkages in the model database. 
 
 
 
